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Article

The Publicization of Home-Based Care
Work in State Labor Law
Peggie R. Smith†
Home-based care workers have experienced a labor metamorphism of sorts over the last decade. The workers, most of
whom are women,1 care for children and the elderly from within the private sphere of the home in exchange for compensation.2 Once invisible and ignored, they have become darlings of
the labor movement. While they have not halted the persistent
decline in union density, they have helped to reinvigorate organized labor. The transformation first attracted national attention in 1999 when the Service Employees International Union
(SEIU) won the right to represent 74,000 home care workers in
Los Angeles, California.3 The victory marked the largest increase since 1941 in new union membership resulting from a
single union election.4 Six years later, SEIU charted new territory once again when more than 49,000 family child care providers in Illinois voted overwhelmingly to join the union.5 The
† Professor of Law, University of Iowa, College of Law. J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1993; M.A., Yale University, 1990; B.A., Yale University, 1987.
For helpful comments and suggestions during the writing of this Article, I
wish to thank Rafael Gely and Margaret Raymond. The research for this Article was supported by an appointment at the Obermann Center for Advanced
Studies at the University of Iowa. Copyright © 2008 by Peggie R. Smith.
1. Ninety percent of all nursing home aides and home care aides are
women. Rhonda J.V. Montgomery et al., A Profile of Home Care Workers from
the 2000 Census: How It Changes What We Know, 45 GERONTOLOGIST 593,
595 (2005).
2. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text (defining family child
care and home care).
3. Linda Delp & Katie Quan, Homecare Worker Organizing in California:
An Analysis of a Successful Strategy, 27 LAB. STUD. J. 1, 2 (2002).
4. Id.; Stu Schneider, Victories for Home Health Care Workers, DOLLARS
& SENSE, Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 25, 26.
5. Peggie R. Smith, Welfare, Child Care, and the People Who Care: Union
Representation of Family Child Care Providers, 55 KAN. L. REV. 321, 321
(2007).
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vote netted labor its second largest membership election since
1941.6
In accomplishing these victories, the labor movement dispelled the myth that, because home-based care workers toil in
the private setting of the home and are isolated from each other, they are unorganizable. Labor also perfected a new model of
organizing, one capable of representing the workers even as the
law views many of them as independent contractors who lack
rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).7
This Article examines the labor movement’s campaign to
unionize home-based care workers, who are often deemed independent contractors, in both the child care and home care sectors. It focuses specifically on those workers who provide publicly subsidized care. In the wake of strong union advocacy,
states have utilized various measures including legislation, gubernatorial executive orders, ballot initiatives, and intergovernmental cooperation agreements to extend labor law rights
to this group of workers. Although the measures differ in terms
of the actual bundle of rights granted, most share a common
structural feature: they designate a state agency to function as
an employer of record for the workers and to recognize a union
representative on their behalf. To date, at least thirteen states
have adopted such measures.8
The success of these recent state developments, which
promise to improve the situation of home-based care workers,
hinges significantly on transformations in the delivery of publicly subsidized child care and home care. Increasingly, states
rely on individual care workers, rather than agencies that employ care workers, to deliver publicly funded care. For example,
consumer-directed home care programs, which allow clients rather than home care agencies to hire and supervise workers,
are growing in popularity.9 Similarly, the use of family child
care, whereby a provider cares for children in her own residence, is expanding relative to center-based child care.10

6. Id.
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”).
8. See infra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (listing states and their
respective governmental measures).
9. A.E. Benjamin, Consumer-Directed Services at Home: A New Model for
Persons with Disabilities, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 80, 81.
10. ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., THE STUDY OF CHILDREN IN FAMILY CHILD
CARE AND RELATIVE CARE: HIGHLIGHTS OF FINDINGS 1 (1994) (“Care in the
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In both the family child care and home care settings, the
state pays workers to provide care,11 yet the compensation
rates are too low to ensure a decent wage.12 In addition, most
states insist that home-based care workers are not government
employees, but rather independent contractors to whom states
owe no obligation under applicable labor and employment
laws.13 This dynamic has set the stage for union efforts to gain
collective bargaining rights on behalf of publicly subsidized
home-based care workers in order to provide such workers with
a voice in negotiating with government agencies over the terms
of their labor arrangements.
I. BACKGROUND: THE SHARED CHARACTERISTICS OF
HOME-BASED CARE WORK
This Article uses the phrase “home-based care work” to refer to two types of paid caregiving that occur within the home:
home care and family child care. Home care refers to in-home
services provided to elderly and/or disabled individuals who require assistance with personal care tasks such as grooming,
dressing, and bathing, and household activities such as shopping, cleaning, and meal preparation.14 Most home care consumers are elderly individuals with long-term-care needs.15
home of a provider is the most prevalent form of child care for young children
with employed mothers in the United States today.”).
11. JOSHUA M. WIENER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE 13
(2000), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000056.pdf.
12. Paula England et al., Wages of Virtue: The Relative Pay of Care Work,
49 SOC. PROBS. 455, 455 (2002) (explaining that those engaged in care work
receive lower wages than expected based on their qualifications and the skill
required for the job); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational
Employment and Wages, 2006 (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf (listing lower wages for home-based care workers
than for coatroom attendants).
13. See Peggie R. Smith, Home Sweet Home? Workplace Casualties of Consumer-Directed Home Care for the Elderly, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 537, 556 (2007) (discussing the desire of states to craft consumerdirected home care programs so as to avoid liability to workers under labor
and employment laws); Smith, supra note 5, at 353–56 (discussing how Rhode
Island avoided workplace obligations to family child care providers through
litigation).
14. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-96-5, LONG-TERM CARE:
SOME STATES APPLY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS TO HOME CARE WORKERS 2 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/pe96005.pdf; Delp
& Quan, supra note 3, at 3.
15. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that the
typical home care recipient is “a woman with functional limitations who is
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Family child care refers to child care services that a worker
provides for compensation in her own residence to two or more
unrelated children.16
Although the exact number of workers in home care and
family child care is unclear,17 researchers agree that the work
is expanding. Indeed, the demand for home care is so strong
that the job ranks among the top three industry sectors where
experts project employment to grow the fastest over the coming
years.18 Employment in family child care is also on an upward
trajectory; in many areas of the country, it is the fastestgrowing segment of the child care industry.19
very elderly, has a low income, and lives alone”); Benjamin, supra note 9, at 80
(reporting that a majority of long-term care recipients are elderly individuals
who are cared for primarily in their homes).
16. KATIE HAMM & AVIS JONES-DEWEEVER, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POLICY
RESEARCH, FAMILY CHILD CARE: RECENT TRENDS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 1
(2004), available at http://www.kwdi.re.kr/data/wotrend2/family_child_care_
trends.pdf (describing family child care “as a paid provider who cares for two
or more unrelated children in her home, although the provider may care for
her own children at the same time”).
17. See ALICE BURTON ET AL., CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE,
ESTIMATING THE SIZE AND COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. CHILD CARE WORKFORCE
AND CAREGIVING POPULATION 17 (2002), available at http://www.ccw.org/
pubs/workforceestimatereport.pdf (estimating that there were 650,000 family
child care providers caring for children aged five and under, excluding care
provided by relatives for pay); see also AMY R. GILLMAN, SURDNA FOUND.,
STRENGTHENING FAMILY CHILD CARE IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 3 (2001),
available at http://www.surdna.org/usr_doc/childcare.pdf (“Family child care is
the fastest-growing segment of the child care industry and represents the most
frequently used ‘out of home’ care in the country.”); Daniel E. Hecker, Occupational Employment Projections to 2014, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2005, at 70,
75 tbl.2 (reporting that 624,000 home-health aides were employed in 2004,
and that 701,000 personal and home care aides were employed in 2004). But
see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WHO CARES FOR AMERICA’S CHILDREN? CHILD
CARE POLICY FOR THE 1990S 151 (Cheryl D. Hayes et al. eds., 1990) (suggesting that these figures do not capture the full extent of the workforces given
that “many family day care providers operate in the underground economy”
and therefore “precise estimates of their numbers and the number of children
they serve are illusive”).
18. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Tomorrow’s
Jobs, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 1, 6 fig.7 (2008–09), available at
http://www.bls.gov/oco/reprints/ocor001.pdf (projecting personal and home care
aides as the second fastest growing occupation between 2006 and 2016, and
projecting home health aides as the third fastest growing occupation between
2006 and 2016); see also BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
Health Care, in CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES 231, 234 (2006–07), available
at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/pdf/cgs035.pdf (projecting a 66.4% growth rate for
home health aides and a 60.5% growth rate for personal and home care aides
between 2004 and 2014).
19. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at 3 (“Family child care is the fastest-
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The entry of women into the paid work force, and the
changing structure of family life, has fueled the growth in both
job sectors.20 With respect to child care, the labor force participation rate for women with children under six years of age has
risen from 18.6% in 196021 to 62.6% in 2005.22 Because of this
dramatic climb, many parents substitute paid child care for
maternal care; for small children, families prefer family child
care to other child care options such as center-based care.23 The
link between family child care’s growth and the increase in
women’s labor force participation also reflects the effects of welfare reform legislation enacted in 1996.24 The legislation conditioned receipt of benefits on employment, pushing mothers into
the workforce, and thus bolstered the demand for child care,
especially family child care.25
In the context of home care, the rise in women’s labor force
participation has combined with the graying of America to fuel
the growth in the home care industry. As a result of aging baby
boomers, seventy-two million Americans will be sixty-five or
older by 2030,26 double the number of Americans who were sixty-five or older in 2000.27 In most households with elderly famigrowing segment of the child care industry and represents the most frequently
used out of home-care in the country.”).
20. Smith, supra note 5, at 325.
21. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1999, at 417 tbl.659 (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/
99statab/sec13.pdf (providing the percentage of married women in the workforce with children under six).
22. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2005 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT 13–15
tbl.5 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-table5-2006.pdf; see also
JODY HEYMANN, THE WIDENING GAP 214 fig.A.2 (2000) (graphing the labor
force participation rate of women with children between 1940 and 1999).
23. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
24. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1305 (2000)); see also Bruce Fuller et al., Welfare Reform and Child Care Options for Low-Income Families, FUTURE OF CHILD., Feb. 2002, at 97, 102 (noting that—by conservative estimates—welfare reform prompted the movement
of at least one million children into child care settings between 1996 and
1998).
25. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at i (“With the advent of welfare reform,
family child care has been touted by policymakers and others as a costeffective way to . . . expand the child care supply in low-income communities.”).
26. WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 65+ IN THE UNITED STATES:
2005, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209
.pdf.
27. Id.
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ly members who need long-term care, women serve as informal
care providers.28 This provider pool is shrinking, however, as
more and more women find it impossible to adequately care for
aging relatives while also both working outside of the home and
caring for children.29 To address this caregiving gap, households are turning to home care workers.
Despite the rapid growth of the industries and the increased demand for home-based care workers, a shortage of
qualified workers characterizes home care and family child
care; moreover, high job turnover rates within the industry
greatly exacerbate this problem. In the home care field, studies
indicate that as many as half of all workers quit their jobs
every year.30 High turnover rates create general disruptions for
clients and compromise the quality of care clients receive, as
fewer workers often translate into clients receiving fewer hours
of needed care.31 Inadequate care caused by high turnover can
ultimately result in serious consequences,32 such as client hospitalization and even a client’s relocation to an institutional
setting such as a nursing home.

28. EMILY K. ABEL, WHO CARES FOR THE ELDERLY? 4 (1991) (commenting
that women represent seventy-two percent of all caregivers for the elderly); see
also BELDEN RUSSONELLO ET AL., AM. ASS’N FOR RETIRED PEOPLE, IN THE
MIDDLE: A REPORT ON MULTICULTURAL BOOMERS COPING WITH FAMILY AND
AGING ISSUES 55 (2001), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/il/in_the_
middle.pdf (noting that women are much more likely to “talk to doctors, arrange for aides, and help with personal care”).
29. See NORA SUPER, NAT’L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, WHO WILL BE THERE
TO CARE? THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN CAREGIVER SUPPLY AND DEMAND 11
(2002), available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_bp/BP_Caregivers_1-02.pdf
(“Women, who traditionally cared for their parents, are now more likely to be
in the workforce, and are having children later in life. These individuals are
popularly called the ‘sandwich generation,’ because they are squeezed between
parents and children.”).
30. CANDACE HOWES, WAGES, BENEFITS AND FLEXIBILITY MATTER:
BUILDING A HIGH QUALITY HOME CARE WORKFORCE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/download/HowesSummaryFinal.pdf.
31. Id.; see also IRMA C. BERMEA, TEX. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., EVALUATION OF PERSONAL ATTENDANT TRAINING PROGRAMS 9 (2001), available at
http://www.dhs.state.tx.us/publications/SB95reportMarch2001.pdf (commenting on the shortage of home care workers in Texas and stating that “[f ]or some
disabled individuals, it means a lack of access to the home health care services
they need to live healthy and productive lives”).
32. See ROBYN I. STONE & JOSHUA M. WIENER, WHO WILL CARE FOR US?
ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM CARE WORKFORCE CRISIS 14–15 (2001), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/CareForUs.pdf; Robyn
Stone, The Direct Care Worker: The Third Rail of Home Care Policy, 25 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 521, 525 (2004).
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In the context of family child care, between twenty-three
and fifty-nine percent of family child care providers leave their
jobs each year.33 Such instability can undermine children’s
sense of security and hinder their social development.34 Turnover can also adversely impact the workplace opportunities of
parents who must miss work in order stay home with a child
when a care provider quits.35
The demographic profile of home-based care workers combined with their economic status and poor working conditions
help explain the difficulty in maintaining a stable workforce.
Women account for the overwhelming majority—at least ninety
percent—of home care workers36 and family child care providers.37 As with paid care work generally, race and ethnicity
heavily mediate these occupations, resulting in overrepresentation of women of color, especially African Americans and Latinas.38 Many of the workers are also immigrants, especially in
the home care context.39

33. Christine M. Todd & Deanna M. Deery-Schmitt, Factors Affecting
Turnover Among Family Child Care Providers: A Longitudinal Study, 11 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 351, 352 (1996).
34. See id. at 351–52 (explaining that stable care arrangements produce
higher levels of social development and academic achievement).
35. See HEYMANN, supra note 22, at 2 (noting that many parents cannot
leave work to care for a sick child).
36. See Montgomery et al., supra note 1 (reporting that ninety percent of
all home care workers are women).
37. MARY C. TUOMINEN, WE ARE NOT BABYSITTERS: FAMILY CHILD CARE
PROVIDERS REDEFINE WORK AND CARE 5 (2003) (reporting that over ninetyeight percent of all family child care providers are women).
38. See STEVEN L. DAWSON ET AL., PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE
INST., DIRECT-CARE HEALTH WORKERS: THE UNNECESSARY CRISIS IN LONGTERM CARE 12 (2001), available at http://www.directcareclearinghouse.org/
download/Aspen.pdf (reporting that thirty percent of healthcare paraprofessionals are women of color); TUOMINEN, supra note 37, at 6 (“While women of
color represent 13 percent of paid workers in the United States . . . women of
color make up one-third of all paid child care workers . . . .” (citations omitted)); Paula England & Nancy Folbre, Care, Inequality, and Policy, in CHILD
CARE AND INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH
133, 133 (Francesca M. Cancian et al. eds., 2002) (“[W]omen of color are overrepresented in many of the most poorly paid caring jobs.”); Montgomery et al.,
supra note 1 (“Almost half of the direct care workers . . . are non-White or Hispanic.”).
39. See Montgomery et al., supra note 1, at 595; see also Lynn May Rivas,
Invisible Labors: Caring for the Independent Person, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW ECONOMY 70, 73 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002) (noting that a significant proportion of personal attendants are immigrants).
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As a group, home-based care workers are disproportionately poor and low-income women whose earnings place them near
the bottom of the economic ladder. In 2006, they earned less
per hour than workers employed as locker room and coatroom
attendants, gaming-booth cashiers, meter readers, and bicycle
repairers.40 In addition, most home-based care workers do not
receive job-related benefits such as health insurance, medical
leave, or retirement plans.41
These disadvantageous working conditions hinge, in part,
on the work’s close association with women’s unpaid work in
the home, and the traditional views regarding such work.
Home-based care workers suffer from society’s perception that
family caregiving is unskilled labor with limited economic value, and the belief that women should perform such activities
not for money, but out of love.42 Consistent with this traditional
view, research reveals that individuals who work in caregiving
jobs experience a “wage penalty” that captures the social and
economic devaluation of care work.43
The low earnings in home-based care work also highlight
the point that those who most need care, including children and
the elderly, are often least able to pay for it.44 Absent family
members providing informal care or paying for formal care, individuals in need of care routinely rely on the government for
40. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 12, at 14–21
(comparing the median hourly wages of the following jobs: child-care workers
($8.48); personal and home care aides ($8.54); locker room and coatroom attendants ($8.95); booth cashiers ($9.94); utility meter readers ($14.58); bicycle
repairers ($10.48); and service station attendants ($8.53)).
41. See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE CHILD CARE WORKFORCE, A PROFILE OF THE
SAN MATEO COUNTY CHILD CARE WORKFORCE 4 (2002), available at http://
www.sanmateo4cs.org/altruesite/files/4cs/GetFacts/2002ChildWorkforce.pdf;
see also Smith, supra note 5, at 334 (“Rarely do [family child care] providers
receive benefits such as health insurance, vacation time, or retirement
plans.”). For sources that discuss this issue in home care, see DAWSON ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 6 (“[The] quality of direct-care jobs tends to be extremely
poor. Wages are low and benefits few; ironically, most direct-care staff do not
receive employer-paid health insurance.”), and Rebecca Donovan, “We Care for
the Most Important People in Your Life”: Home Care Workers in New York
City, WOMEN’S STUD. Q., Spring/Summer 1989, at 56, 62 (1989) (reporting on
the lack of healthcare benefits available to home care workers).
42. TUOMINEN, supra note 37, at 88–89.
43. See, e.g., England et al., supra note 12, at 455 (“When we say that
doing care work entails a ‘wage penalty,’ we mean that those in these occupations receive, on average, lower hourly pay than we would predict them to
have based on the other characteristics of the jobs, their skill demands, and
the qualifications of those holding the jobs.”).
44. Id. at 456.
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assistance.45 Unfortunately, the reality of inadequate public
support for family caregiving has troubling implications for
those home-based care workers who provide publicly subsidized
care. The high cost of and increasing demand for family care
has led states to explore and adopt cost-savings strategies. In
the context of child care, states regard family child care as a
cost-effective approach to help meet the child care needs of
women transitioning from welfare to work.46 Similarly, in the
context of home care, policymakers view consumer-directed
home care as less costly than traditional agency-based home
care.47 Yet while these strategies may save money, states frequently fail to consider the cost borne by publicly subsidized
workers in the form of low compensation rates and a lack of
benefits.48 While these problems adversely impact all workers
who deliver subsidized care, they fall disproportionately on
workers regarded as independent contractors of the state. Both
family child care providers and consumer-directed home care
workers tend to receive less than their cohorts—who work for
child care centers and home care agencies—although they each
provide the same care.49
II. CHALLENGES TO EMPOWERING HOME-BASED CARE
WORKERS
Various factors have contributed to the labor movement’s
ability to unionize home-based care workers, including a favorable political climate and a convergence of interests between
workers and consumers. While not minimizing the relevance of
these factors, this Part examines some of the practical challenges that labor has had to confront in order to secure labor
law rights for home care workers and family child care provid45. Id.
46. See GILLMAN, supra note 17, at i (“With the advent of welfare reform,
family child care has been touted by policymakers and others as a costeffective way to . . . expand the child care supply in low-income communities.”).
47. See WIENER, supra note 11, at 11–12.
48. See Smith, supra note 5, at 337–38 (discussing the establishment of
reimbursement rates for publicly subsidized family child care providers); Joshua M. Wiener et al., Home and Community-Based Services in Seven States,
23 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 89, 109 (2002) (discussing the problem of
low reimbursement rates in home care).
49. WIENER, supra note 11, at 13 (“Consumer-directed care is often less
expensive than agency-directed care because independent workers receive less
supervision and fringe benefits and sometimes lower wages than agencydirected employees.”).
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ers. These challenges include an atomized workforce and the
work’s location in individual homes.
A. MOBILIZING THE WORKERS
The invisibility of home-based care workers presents a
first-order obstacle to organizing them. How does one effectively organize workers whose jobs seem completely antithetical to
any notion of collective action? Before workers can be organized, they must be identified and mobilized. In the traditional
arena of manufacturing jobs, this first-order step was relatively
straightforward—union organizers could stand at the factory
gate and both identify and recruit workers as they entered or
departed.50 This approach, however, has no utility when applied to home-based care workers. Not only are workers hidden
in individual homes, but they are also fragmented throughout
neighborhoods, towns, and cities.51 Instead of laboring together
in central locations, home-based care workers most commonly
work alone in private homes. Even more problematic for organization purposes, a home care worker frequently cares for several clients,52 and thus works at several different “worksites.”
Labor has responded to this challenge by employing strategies to mobilize nontraditional workforces like home care workers and family child care providers. These strategies include
reaching out to workers by forging ties with groups and organizations in their communities, using the media to reach workers,

50. See, e.g., James T. Barnett & Manuel H. Johnson, Private Sector Unions in the Political Arena: Public Policy Versus Employee Preference, in WHAT
ROLE FOR GOVERNMENT? 116, 119 (Richard Zeckhauser & Derek Leebaert
eds., 1983) (“[O]rganizing workers at the factory gate is no longer as productive an activity as it was in the past.”); see also Peggie R. Smith, Organizing
the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Approaches to Employee Representation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 76 (2000) (“[T]he traditional model
of organizing envisions a process whereby both the employer and the bargaining unit are readily identifiable. In manufacturing jobs, organizers can often
contact workers by standing in the factory owner’s parking lot or at the factory
gate.”).
51. See, e.g., Barbara Rose, Local 880: Labor’s New Up-and-Comer, CHI.
TRIB., July 5, 2005, at 1 (“Isolated and scattered in homes around the state,
working on and off as their circumstances change, they are a high-turnover
group that is hard to reach.”); Smith, supra note 5, at 340, 342 (discussing the
difficulties that labor-organizing campaigns face trying to locate family child
care providers and home care workers).
52. See, e.g., Jessica Toledano, Health Workers for Home-Bound to Vote on
Union, L.A. BUS. J., Feb. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WLNR 5466674 (describing the efforts of home care workers to unionize in California).
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and holding rallies to vocalize issues of concern to workers.53 In
addition, union organizers commonly go door-to-door to contact
workers at their homes.54 Although extremely resource intensive, these strategies have allowed labor to effectively mobilize
home-based care workers.
B. FOLLOWING THE MONEY: IDENTIFYING COMMONALITY FOR
BARGAINING PURPOSES
Together with figuring out how to mobilize home-based
care workers, unions must solve the dilemma posed by the fact
that many home-based care workers lack a traditional employment relationship with a common employer for bargaining
purposes. As this Section demonstrates, unions have tackled
this obstacle by taking advantage of the increasingly public
quality of home-based care work. Before elaborating on this
point, the discussion first outlines how the structure of homebased care work impedes the formation of an employment relationship that can enable workers to engage in collective bargaining.
In the family child care industry, providers usually enter
into individual contracts with the parents for whom they provide child care.55 If the law were to recognize an employment
53. See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 434 (1995) (describing the Workplace Project, a community-based worker center in Long Island, N.Y., dedicated to organizing immigrant workers, and its use of Spanish-language media to inform immigrant
workers of their rights); Victor Narro, Home Is Where the Union Is: Los Angeles Domestic Workers Find Innovative Ways to Exercise Their Rights, THIRD
FORCE, Jan.–Feb. 1998, at 18, 19 (discussing the Domestic Workers Association and describing its use of public-service announcements on Los Angeles
Spanish-language radio and television stations to recruit members); Immanuel
Ness, Organizing Home Health-Care Workers, WORKINGUSA, Nov. 1999, at
59, 73 (discussing the grassroots strategies that labor used to organize home
health-care workers in New York including “public hearings, rank-and-file
lobbying, polling, coalition building, rallies, organized press campaigns, and
soliciting support from prominent leaders and public officials”).
54. See, e.g., Margarita Bauza, Service Union Raises Workers’ Pay, Hopes,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 2, 2007, at 1A (“The union sidestepped those hurdles by visiting people at home, collecting signatures and passing out leaflets.”); Patrice M. Mareschal, Innovation and Adaptation: Contrasting Efforts
to Organize Home Care Workers in Four States, LAB. STUD. J., Mar. 2006, at
25, 32 (2006) (observing that in Oregon, SEIU gathered signatures in support
of the initiative by “making house calls, engaging workers in political activism,
and building coalitions with senior citizens and disabled persons”).
55. See Position Statement, Nat’l Ass’n for Family Child Care, Best Practices for Family Child Care Union Organizing 1 (2006), available at http://
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relationship in this context, it would be between the provider
and each parent, and the relationship would appear to fall
within the NLRA’s coverage.56 Because providers exercise considerable control over how they perform their jobs,57 however, it
is extremely unlikely that a provider-parent employment relationship exists. Instead, family child care providers generally
operate as independent contractors and, as a result, they are
outside the NLRA’s purview.58 Yet even if the law did regard
the provider-parent relationship as an employment relationship covered by the NLRA, considerable hurdles to unionization
would remain. As an initial matter, a provider could not engage
in collective bargaining unless she joined forces with other providers, which would be no easy task given that providers typically work alone. Assuming, however, that a group of providers
did join forces, a fatal problem would still remain because the
providers, as a group, lack an identifiable parent-employer with
whom to bargain, since each provider works for many different
parents.
The difficulties in gaining employee status and in determining the employer for purposes of bargaining are absent in a
center-based child care setting. In this context, where parents
contract with the center to provide care and the center employs
the workers, a union can readily identify both the bargaining

www.nafcc.org/documents/NAFCCUnionBestPractices.pdf (“Family child care
providers are self-employed business owners who contract directly with clients
and set the terms and conditions for the enrollment of children in their child
care homes, including the program’s tuition, fees and operating hours.”).
56. Although the NLRA excludes domestic service workers from its definition of employee, the exclusion does not apply to family child care providers.
The NLRA’s domestic service exemption applies to anyone employed “in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(2000) (emphasis added). This language does not apply to a family child care
provider because the provider cares for children in her own residence and not
in the home of the children. By contrast, the NLRA’s domestic service provision would seem to reach nannies as they work in the home of the person or
family for whom they provide child care services.
57. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 1. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the courts apply general agency principles that accord significant weight to the level of control that a company exercises over the
“manner and means” by which a worker performs her job to distinguish between employees and independent contractors. See Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Control exercised over the ‘manner and means of performance’ . . . is the identifying
characteristic of an employer/employee relationship.”).
58. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . .
any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”).
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unit (employees of the center), as well as the employer (the center).
The structure of home care lends itself to a comparable
analysis. Most home care workers are employed by home care
agencies and, similar to center-based child care workers in the
family child care context, if employed by a private agency, they
most likely possess rights under the NLRA.59 In this scenario,
the identification of a bargaining unit and the employer with
whom to bargain does not pose any particular hurdles.
Obstacles, however, surface in the context of home care
workers who are hired directly by individual clients and/or
their family members. At first glance, because these independent workers likely can establish an employment relationship
with clients, it appears that they may fare better than family
child care providers in terms of securing protection under the
NLRA. Unlike family child care providers, who clearly lack an
employment relationship with the parents of the children for
whom they care, independent home care workers may well
qualify as employees of their clients (and/or family members of
the clients) given that the clients may exert considerable control over the manner in which the workers perform their jobs.60
Yet even if such an employment relationship exists, it does
not afford the worker protection under the NLRA. Like many
labor and employment law statutes, the NLRA contains a domestic-service provision that exempts from coverage anyone
employed “in the domestic service of any family or person at his
home” including home care workers.61 According to the National Labor Relations Board, this exemption applies where the
“employment [is] on an individual and personal basis.”62 As a
59. To be exact, agency employees likely possess rights under the NLRA if
they work for private agencies, as the NLRA does not apply to public-sector
employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding from the definition of “employer” all
federal, state, and local government entities).
60. The hallmark of home care arrangements, whereby consumers direct
their own care, is that they allow consumers “to have an employer/employee
relationship with their individual service providers.” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVS., IN-HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY AND
DISABLED: A COMPARISON OF CLIENT-DIRECTED AND PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT MODELS OF SERVICE DELIVERY, at iii (1999), available at http://
aspe.hhs.gov/pic/pdf/6173.pdf.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); see also Smith, supra note 13, at 544 n.50 (listing
statutes that have domestic-service exemptions attached).
62. 30 Sutton Place Corp., 240 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 n.6 (1979) (quoting Success Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, UAW, 397 A.2d 85, 87 (Conn.
1978)).
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result, home care workers in the employ of individual homeowners lack coverage under the NLRA. Even assuming workers
could overcome this exception, they, like family child care providers, lack an identifiable entity with which to bargain, as
each worker may have several employers, and the workers
would seldom have employers in common.
Home-based care workers who provide publicly subsidized
care have also tried to secure collective bargaining rights by
claiming that they are employees of the government agencies
that fund such care. Unfortunately, courts have rejected these
claims and have ruled that publicly subsidized, home-based
care workers have an independent contractor relationship with
government funding agencies, not an employment relationship.63 Despite these rulings, unions are focusing their organizing efforts on this group of workers. Because the workers are
publicly funded, they share a point of commonality that unions
hope to leverage. Since the government largely determines the
compensation paid to workers and can best provide them with
workplace benefits relative to individual consumers and/or
their family members, the labor movement’s goal is to persuade
states both to treat the workers as quasi-public-sector employees, and also to negotiate with their labor representative
regarding the terms under which they provide publicly funded
care. The next Part examines the main legal strategies that unions have used to accomplish this objective. Given that the
NLRA covers only private-sector employment,64 these strategies occur outside of the context of the NLRA, and thus must
take account of state and local public-sector labor relations statutes.
III. THE PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF LABOR
CAMPAIGNS
As the previous Section discussed, when it comes to publicly subsidized home-based care workers, labor law usually classifies their relationship with the state as that of independent
contractors. Despite this legal status, such workers now possess
labor rights, including collective bargaining rights, in several
states. To date, the labor movement has campaigned success63. See infra notes 70–73, 172–75 and accompanying text (discussing cases that address the issue of whether publicly subsidized home-care workers
are public employees or independent contractors).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (excluding from the definition of “employer” all federal, state, and local government entities).
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fully to extend labor law protections to publicly subsidized
home care workers in at least nine states, including California,
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.65 Family child care has experienced an
even greater flurry of organizing activity. In the last two years,
the labor movement has secured labor rights for publicly subsidized family child care providers in ten states: Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.66
65. For California, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(a) (West
2007); for Illinois, see 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3, 315/7 (West 2007); for
Iowa, see Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, 28 Iowa Admin. Bull. 221 (July 4, 2005);
for Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 118G, §§ 28–33 (2006); for Michigan, see Interlocal Agreement Between the Department of Community Health
and the Tri-County Aging Consortium (June 10, 2004) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Michigan Interlocal Agreement], and MICH. DEP’T OF CMTY.
HEALTH, BENEFICIARY ELIGIBILITY BULLETIN: HEALTH CARE ELIGIBILITY POLICY 04-07 (2004), available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/HCEP_
04-07_110034_7.pdf; for Ohio, see Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23S (July 17,
2007),
available
at
http://www.governor.ohio.gov/Portals/0/Executive%
20Order%202007-23S.pdf; for Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 410.600–
.614 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007); for Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE §§
74.39A.220–.300 (2006); and for Wisconsin, see Wisconsin Office of the Governor, Wisconsin Quality Home Care Commission, http://www.wisgov.state.wi
.us/appointments_detail.asp?boardid=213 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
66. For Illinois, see 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West Supp.
2006); for Iowa, see Iowa Exec. Order No. 45, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 370 (Jan.
16, 2006), and Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, 29 Iowa Admin. Bull. 373 (Jan. 16,
2006); for Kansas, see Kan. Exec. Order No. 07-21 (July 18, 2007), available at
http://www.governor.ks.gov/executive/Orders/exec_order0721.htm; for Michigan, see DEBORAH CHALFIE ET AL., GETTING ORGANIZED: UNIONIZING HOMEBASED CHILD CARE PROVIDERS 18–19, 25 n.26, 31 n.176 (2007), available at
www.nwlc.org/pdf/GettingOrganized2007.pdf (citing Interlocal Agreement Between the Michigan Department of Human Services and Mott Community
College Creating the Michigan Home Based Child Care Council (July 27,
2006), and Letter from Jennifer Granholm, Governor of Mich., to Marianne
Udow, Dir., Dep’t of Human Servs., and M. Richard Shaink, President, Mott
Cmty. Coll. (Sept. 1, 2006)); for New Jersey, see N.J. Exec. Order No. 23 (Sept.
5, 2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eojsc23.htm; for
New York, see N.Y. Exec. Order No. 12 (May 8, 2007), available at http://www
.ny.gov/governor/executive_orders/exeorders/12.pdf; for Oregon, see OR. REV.
STAT. § 657A.430 (2007); for Pennsylvania, see Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-06
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt
?open=512&objID=401&mode=2 (follow “Directives Management” hyperlink;
then follow “Executive Orders” hyperlink; then follow “2007-06—Registered
Family Child Care Providers” hyperlink) (requiring a state agency to “meet,
confer and discuss with the exclusive representative” of registered family child
care providers on issues of mutual concern), and Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-07
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt
?open=512&objID=401&mode=2 (follow “Directives Management” hyperlink;
then follow “Executive Orders” hyperlink; then follow “2007-07—Subsidized
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This extension of labor rights to independent home-based
care workers often stems from state legislation, executive orders issued by state governors, and the acts of municipalities.
Antitrust law, however, could interfere with such rights, as it
generally prohibits independent contractors from engaging in
collective bargaining.67 Yet despite this general rule, under the
state action doctrine, state regulation can immunize labor activity from antitrust review.68 While the state action doctrine
applies most clearly to state regulation, including legislation, it
may also apply to regulation undertaken by governors in their
executive capacity and by municipalities.69
A. HOME CARE
The home care campaign first achieved national attention
in California, where SEIU, in its early attempts to procure labor rights for publicly funded home care workers, focused on
the judiciary as a means for reform. Specifically, the union
tried to persuade the California courts to recognize publicly
funded home care workers—who cared for elderly and disabled
clients in the Los Angeles County—as employees of the county
under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,70 the California law governing labor relations for local government employees.71 SEIU
Child Care Providers Exempt From Certification or Regulation” hyperlink)
(requiring a state agency to “meet, confer and discuss with the exclusive representative” of exempt family child care providers on issues of mutual concern); for Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.028 (2006 & Supp. 2008);
and for Wisconsin, see Wis. Exec. Order No. 172 (Oct. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/journal_media_detail.asp?locid=19&prid=2359.
67. The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy” that unreasonably restrains competition. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV
2006). Although antitrust law exempts labor organizations, the exemption extends only to the organization of employees, not independent contractors. See
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (2000)) (immunizing labor organization activities designed to carry out
the “legitimate” purposes of labor unions from liability under antitrust laws);
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (“[The] term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual having the status of an independent contractor.”).
68. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943); see also PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 215–216 (3d ed. 2006)
(explaining “state action” immunity).
69. See C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41
B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1059–60 (2000); Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U. L.Q.
521, 548 (2005).
70. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3500–3511 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008).
71. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 434 v. County of L.A., 275 Cal.
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argued that the county, as the workers’ employer, was obligated to negotiate with it as a representative of the county’s
home care workers.72
The court disagreed with this theory, holding that the
workers were employed not by the county, but by the individual
recipients of the workers’ services.73 In response to this judicial
defeat, SEIU redirected its efforts to the legislative process,
where it met success. In 1992, the California legislature passed
a law that authorized, and later required, each county in the
state to create “public authorities,” agencies that would serve
as the legal employer for home care workers for purposes of local collective bargaining laws.74 Los Angeles County established
a public authority in 1997,75 and two years later SEIU won the
right to represent the county’s 74,000 home care workers.76
Hoping to follow in California’s footsteps, the Oregon Public Employees Union (OPEU), an SEIU affiliate, supported a
bill introduced in the Oregon legislature in 1999 that would
have provided for the establishment of a statewide home care
commission, and that would have given publicly funded home
care workers in the state the ability to unionize.77 When the bill
died in the legislature,78 OPEU switched tactics and successfully placed Measure 99 on the 2000 ballot.79 The measure, which
garnered the approval of sixty-three percent of the voters,80
amended the Oregon Constitution to create a Home Care
Commission. It serves as the workers’ employer of record for
purposes of collective bargaining81 and enables the workers to
Rptr. 508, 510 (Ct. App. 1990).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 511.
74. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12302.25(a) (West 2001); see also JANET HEINRITZ-CANTERBURY, PARAPROFESSIONAL HEALTHCARE INST., COLLABORATING TO IMPROVE IN-HOME SUPPORTIVE SERVICES 4–6 (2002),
http://www.paraprofessional.org/publications/CA PA Report.pdf (stating that
the organization and progress of California’s In-Home Supportive Services
Program created public authorities).
75. See Delp & Quan, supra note 3, at 11.
76. See Schneider, supra note 4, at 26.
77. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 32.
78. See id.; Erin Hoover Barnett, Caregivers’ Measure on Ballot, OREGONIAN, July 22, 2000, at D1.
79. See Erin Hoover Barnett, State Strives to Improve Home Care, OREGONIAN, Aug. 2, 2001, at D11.
80. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 33.
81. OR. CONST. art. XV, § 11(3)(f ) (“For purposes of collective bargaining,
the Commission shall be the employer of record of home-care workers hired
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unionize.82 In addition, the workers are regarded as public employees of the state and thus subject to Oregon’s Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act.83 In 2001, the workers voted
to have SEIU represent them.84
The approach to unionization of publicly funded home care
workers in Washington followed a trajectory similar to that in
Oregon. In 2001, legislators considered a bill that would have
provided labor rights to home-based care workers through a
public authority model comparable to those established in California and Oregon.85 When the bill languished in committee, its
proponents turned to a ballot initiative, known as the Homecare Quality Initiative.86 Approximately sixty-two percent of
Washington voters approved the initiative, which established a
Home Care Quality Authority and granted collective bargaining rights to publicly subsidized home care workers.87 During
the 2002 legislative session, the legislature codified the text of
the initiative.88 The law names the authority as the employer of
record for the workers for purposes of collective bargaining.89
Both Michigan and Wisconsin also use a public-authority
model to recognize union representatives of publicly funded
home care workers. These states’ public authorities, however,
were created not by legislation or executive order, but by intergovernmental cooperation agreements.90 Such agreements enadirectly by the client and paid by the State, or by a county or other public
agency which receives money for that purpose from the State.”).
82. See id. art. XV, § 11.
83. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local 503 v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs.,
123 P.3d 300, 303 (Or. 2005).
84. See Dave Hogan, In-Home Care Workers Vote for Union Backing,
SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Dec. 16, 2001, at C10; Schneider, supra note 4, at 25.
85. See S. 5652, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001); H.B. 1576, 57th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001).
86. See 2002 Wash. Initiative 775, available at http://www.secstate.wa
.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i775.pdf; Mareschal, supra note 54, at 35.
87. See Mareschal, supra note 54, at 35.
88. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 74.39A.220–.290 (2006).
89. See id. § 74.39A.270(1); Wash. State–Office of Fin. Mgmt. v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 775, No. 18805-U-04-4777, 2005 WA PERC LEXIS
141, at *2 (Wash. Public Employment Relations Commission Oct. 12, 2005)
(noting that in 2004, the legislature amended the law “to shift the responsibility for bargaining on behalf of the employer from the [authority] to the Governor or the Governor’s designee”).
90. For a broad overview of such agreements, see THOMAS S. KURTZ, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION HANDBOOK 8, 9, 13 (2006), available at
http://www.newpa.com/download.aspx?id=45 (describing forms of cooperation
among municipal governments in Pennsylvania, including intergovernmental
cooperation agreements). See also Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Coop-
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ble local governments to join together to address shared problems or to provide coordinated services.91 In the home care
text, the agreements allow local governments to work together
to improve the delivery and the quality of subsidized home care
on behalf of consumers. In addition, the agreements enable
cal governments to jointly facilitate the workplace interests of
workers by designating an employer of record on behalf of the
workers for bargaining purposes.
In Michigan, an intergovernmental agreement signed by
the Michigan Department of Community Health and the TriCounty Aging Consortium established the Michigan Quality
Community Care Council in 2004.92 The agreement tasks the
council with facilitating the provision of “employer-related
functions” for publicly subsidized home care providers and
promoting an effective home care system on behalf of consumers.93 Under the agreement, the council also has “the right to
bargain collectively and enter into agreements with labor organizations.”94 In 2005, more than 41,000 publicly subsidized
home care workers in the state took the first step toward collective bargaining when they voted to elect SEIU as their representative in negotiations with the council.95
In Wisconsin, an intergovernmental cooperation agreement
was used to establish a public authority known as the Quality
Home Care Commission (QHCC),96 which has the power to bargain collectively with labor organizations that represent publicly subsidized home care workers.97 Whereas the council in
eration, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93,
122–23 (2003) (stating that intergovernmental cooperative agreements can be
characterized as “contracts for services; joint provisions of services; and the
creation of a new unit of government”).
91. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 90, at 99.
92. See Michigan Interlocal Agreement, supra note 65, at 2.
93. See id. § 2.01 (stating that one purpose of the agreement is to “facilitate in the provision of certain employer-related functions for home and community care Providers”).
94. Id. § 6.11.
95. Sharon Terlep, Unions Recruit Health Workers, DETROIT NEWS &
FREE PRESS, Feb. 26, 2006, at 1D.
96. See Wisconsin Quality Home Care Commission, supra note 65. The
power to enter into such agreements is derived from WIS. STAT. § 66.0301
(2005). The statute provides that municipalities may contract with each other
for the “furnishing of services or the joint exercise of any power or duty required or authorized by law.” Id. § 66.0301(2).
97. Cf. JOINT COMM. ON FIN., LEGIS. FISCAL BUREAU, QUALITY HOME
CARE COMMISSION (DHFS–DISABILITY AND ELDER SERVICES) 3–5 (2007),
available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/2007-09budget/Budget%20Papers/
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Michigan is statewide, Wisconsin has adopted a county approach similar to that utilized in California.98 The Wisconsin
agreement allows the state to contract with individual counties
regarding the provision of publicly funded home care services.99
While each county will continue to finance home care within its
boundaries, the QHCC will serve as an employer of record for
home care workers in the counties.100
Although the extension of labor rights to home care workers in Michigan and Wisconsin originates from intergovernmental cooperation agreements, as opposed to state legislative
acts, the relevance of this difference to the workers seems insignificant from a practical standpoint. The workers in Michigan and Wisconsin, similar to those in California, Oregon, and
Washington, now have the ability to vote for a union representative and the right to have a government agency recognize that
representative for purposes of collective bargaining. There is,
however, a legal difference for purposes of antitrust law between the use of state legislation and intergovernmental cooperation agreements.101 As one scholar explains, “the acts of a
state legislature . . . are ipso facto immune without further inquiry, [while] the acts of municipalities and other subordinate
governmental entities are immune only if undertaken pursuant
to a clearly articulated state policy.”102

436.pdf (noting that the Commission is funded through the Service Employees
International Union).
98. Minutes of the Health & Human Needs Committee, Human Services
Board & Long Term Support 2 (Aug. 1, 2006) (recorded by Dawn MacFarlane),
available at http://www.co.dane.wi.us/pdfdocs/minutes/hn20060801.pdf (“Michigan’s Council is statewide, but our proposal is to start with Dane County and
then add from there.”).
99. Cf. id. at 1 (noting that the QHCC is governed by a resolution between
Dane County and the State of Wisconsin).
100. So far, only Dane County has entered into an agreement with the
state to form a QHCC, and as of yet, the workers have not voted to join a union. See JOINT COMM. ON FIN., supra note 97, at 4.
101. See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 69, at 1063 (“Absent any definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts generally have assumed that state
agencies should be treated like municipalities and other subordinate governmental units and that federal antitrust immunity should be accorded to their
programs only if they are adopted pursuant to a clearly articulated policy
adopted by the state legislature or the state supreme court acting in a legislative capacity.”).
102. Id. at 1059–60 (“The Court has explained that because municipalities
are not themselves sovereign, the clear articulation requirement is necessary
to ensure that their acts truly represent the sovereign policy of the state itself.”).
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Because Michigan and Wisconsin rely on the acts of local
governmental entities to extend labor rights to home-based
care workers, the question arises as to whether those acts are
immune from antitrust review. The acts will qualify for immunity “as long as a state confers permissive authority in general
terms for a municipality to deal with a matter within the municipal government’s discretion.”103 The intergovernmental cooperation agreements in Michigan and Wisconsin should readily satisfy this test given that both states authorize local
governmental entities to address issues related to publicly subsidized home care.104
In a few states, including Illinois and Iowa, the labor
movement was successful in persuading state governors to take
action to extend labor law protections to publicly funded home
care workers.105 In Illinois, where low wages and a lack of benefits have long plagued home care workers,106 SEIU Local 880

103. Rossi, supra note 69, at 548 (observing that the Supreme Court actually “abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in assessing municipal
state-action immunity” and explaining that the Court made “state delegation
to a municipal government” sufficient to “meet” the clear-articulation test).
104. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 124.501–.512 (West 2006); see also WIS.
STAT. § 49.45(2)(a)(3) (2005) (providing that the Department of Health and
Family Services may delegate to a county department the task of determining
individual eligibility for various social services, including home health services, under section 49.46).
105. This approach also proved effective in Ohio. In July, 2007, the Governor of Ohio, Ted Strickland, signed an executive order that states that
“[a]lthough [publicly funded home care workers] are not State employees, the
State . . . shall engage in collective bargaining with the elected representative
of the [workers].” Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23S, supra note 65, § 6. But see
Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, to William
J. Seitz, Ohio State Senator (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2008/02/V080001homecare.pdf (stating that Ohio Exec. Order No. 2007-23S is likely to result in “certain anticompetitive conduct that is inconsistent
with federal antitrust law and policy”). The letter was issued by the Federal
Trade Commission’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau of Competition, and Bureau of Economics in response to a request by Ohio Senator William J. Seitz.
Id. The Commission voted 4-1 to authorize issuance of the comments. See
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Submits Comments on Establishing Collective Bargaining for Independent Home Care Providers in Ohio
(Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/inhomecare.shtm.
Commissioner Jon Leibowitz voted against issuance of the comments and issued a dissenting statement. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jon
Leibowitz in re Ohio Executive Order 2007-23S, Matter Number V080001
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/02/
V080001dissentingstatementleibowitz.pdf.
106. See, e.g., Jefferson Robbins, Home Care Providers Seek Raises; State
Pay Is Only $5 Per Hour, ST. J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Mar. 11, 1996, at 7;
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garnered bargaining rights for the workers in 2003, following
the election of the state’s first Democratic governor in almost
twenty years, Rod Blagojevich.107 That year, Governor Blagojevich signed an executive order that requires the state to “recognize a representative designated by a majority of [the workers] as the[ir] exclusive representative” and to “engage in
collective negotiations with said representative concerning all
terms and conditions” of the workers’ employment.108 In 2005,
the Illinois legislature codified the provisions of the executive
order in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.109
The then-Governor of Iowa, Tom Vilsack, followed the lead
of Governor Blagojevich when, in 2005, he signed an executive
order that required a state agency to “meet and confer with the
authorized representative of the individual [home care] providers, as designated by the majority of the individual providers.”110 Iowa’s approach in granting individual home care workers a voice in shaping their labor arrangements with the state
merits two key observations. First, meet-and-confer provisions,
of the type contained in the Iowa executive order, typically possess less bite than collective bargaining provisions.111 As explained by one commentator, “[i]nstead of serving as a satisfactory mechanism for dispute resolution, [meet-and-confer]
statutes often cause greater frustrations in that they only require the employer to consider plans or proposals presented by
the employee representative, rather than to engage in good
faith collective bargaining.”112
While it remains unclear whether Iowa’s meet-and-confer
executive order will eventually result in frustration,113 it is
Brenda Warner Rotzoll, Half of State Home Health Workers Uninsured, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at 21.
107. Christopher Hayes, Healthcare Workers Win Raises, IN THESE TIMES,
Feb. 16, 2004, at 26.
108. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, 29 Ill. Reg. 3386 (Feb. 18, 2005).
109. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(f ), (n), (o) (West 2005 & Supp.
2007).
110. Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, supra note 65, ¶ 1.
111. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the
Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885, 896–99 (1973); David M. Rabban, Can
American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 709–10 (1990).
112. Robert B. Moberly, Public Sector Labor Relations Law in Tennessee:
The Current Inadequacies and the Available Alternatives, 42 TENN. L. REV.
235, 258 (1975).
113. Despite the meet-and-confer nature of the executive order, AFSCME,
the elected representative of the workers, entered into a “Memorandum of Un-
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worth noting that the protections home care workers receive
under the order fall short of the collective bargaining rights
given to state and local government employees by the Iowa
Public Employment Relations Act.114 For example, the Act
grants public employees the right to “[n]egotiate collectively
through representatives of their own choosing” and the right to
“[e]ngage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”115 The executive order, in contrast, extends none of these rights to home
care workers. Instead, it simply provides for a meet-and-confer
process with an authorized representative of the workers.116
The second noteworthy observation about the executive order is that, contrary to the course of events in Illinois, the Iowa
legislature has not codified the order’s provisions into state law.
The failure to do so leaves the workers vulnerable, as the order
“can be overturned at any time by the authorizing Governor, a
future governor, or the legislature.”117 As Michael Herman
points out, “when a new Governor comes into office, she [usually] issues an executive order rescinding the orders of previous
Governors.”118 By contrast, it is far more difficult to repeal an
enactment of a state legislature, making legislation a more effective means of guaranteeing labor rights to home care workers than an executive order alone.
While states have taken various approaches in response to
the labor movement’s attempts to gain labor rights for home
care workers, a key theme emerges from the unionization of
publicly subsidized home care workers: the creation of public
authorities. These public authorities serve not only as employers of record for the workers, but also as entities entrusted with
ensuring the quality of home care services. The public authority structure in Oregon—the Home Care Commission119—is typical in this respect. By law, a majority of the Commission’s
derstanding” with the State in December 2006. The Memorandum provides for
a three percent raise for the workers. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Iowa Department of Human Services and the American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Iowa Public Employees Council 61,
AFL-CIO (AFSCME) 1 (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.ime.state.ia.us/
docs/CDAC-MemorandumOfUnderstanding.pdf.
114. See IOWA CODE §§ 20.1–.31 (2001).
115. See id. § 20.8.
116. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 43, supra note 65, ¶ 1.
117. See Michael S. Herman, Gubernatorial Executive Orders, 30 RUTGERS
L.J. 987, 990 (1999).
118. Id.
119. See OR. CONST. art. XV, § 11(2)(a).
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board members are consumers.120 The board is responsible for
ensuring high-quality care for consumers, providing training
opportunities for workers, establishing worker qualifications,
and maintaining a registry of qualified workers for the benefit
of consumers searching for caregivers.121 This strong emphasis
on consumer protection, combined with the focus on empowering workers, underscores the labor movement’s recognition that
the interests of consumers and workers are inextricably linked.
When workers are treated with respect and compensated with
a living wage, they are more likely to invest in their jobs and to
provide quality care.
Thus far, unionization has created tangible benefits that
have improved the economic status of publicly subsidized home
care workers. Those benefits include wage increases of close to
twenty percent for workers in Michigan,122 and thirty-four percent for workers in Illinois.123 In Oregon, collective bargaining
has gained workers wage increases, health benefits, and paid
leave, as well as coverage under the state’s workers’ compensation statute.124 Likewise, in Washington, the union contract
with the state includes wage increases, health care coverage,
dental and vision benefits, workers’ compensation coverage,
and vacation benefits.125
While the labor movement has been largely successful in
winning the right to represent independent home care workers,
it has experienced roadblocks. The most publicized setback oc120. See id.
121. See id. art. XV, § 11(1)(b).
122. See Cynthia Estlund et al., New Ways of Governing the Workplace:
Proceedings of the 2007 Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y
J. 111, 131 (2007).
123. See SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, HEALTH CARE DIV., BUILDING A
NATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR QUALITY HEALTH CARE 3 (2004), http://www
.seiu1984.org/appResources/scDocs/HealthDivision.Rpt.pdf; Joan Fitzgerald,
Getting Serious About Good Jobs, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 2006, at 33, 35.
124. See, e.g., Mareschal, supra note 54, at 32–34 (“It provided for a pay
increase of almost 10 percent, health insurance, workers’ compensation, and
paid time off.”); SERV. EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, supra note 123, at 3; SERV.
EMPLOYEES INT’L UNION, WORKING TOGETHER FOR QUALITY PERSONAL CARE
5 (2005), http://s67.advocateoffice.com/vertical/sites/%7ba168c1b2-e6e9-4583
-8bd1-9f21d62ca0c4%7d/uploads/%7b94c40e53-4fd4-47d2-aabf-71a33e87a66f%
7d.pdf.
125. See Collective Bargaining Agreement by and Between the State of
Washington and Service Employees International Union 775, at 18–23 (2007),
available at http://www.hcqa.wa.gov/Collective_Barg/coll_barg_docs/SEIU_
2007-2009.pdf.
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curred in New Jersey. In 2003, a bill known as the Quality
Home Care Act was introduced in both Houses of the New Jersey legislature.126 The bill proposed the creation of several
home care councils to operate publicly funded home care in the
state.127 The bill, which provided a ten-dollar-per-hour minimum wage for workers, designated the councils as the employers of the workers and gave workers collective bargaining
rights.128 In the face of considerable opposition, the bill ultimately died in committee.129 The bill’s demise, argues Patrice
Mareschal, demonstrates the influence of the strong for-profit
home care market in New Jersey.130 Contrary to most other
states, where SEIU has organized home care workers, New
Jersey relies on for-profit agencies to deliver the overwhelming
bulk of publicly subsidized home care.131 The bill would have
allowed each council to control all publicly funded home care in
its region, effectively restricting for-profit agencies to serving
only private-pay consumers.132 Not surprisingly, much of the
opposition to the bill originated with for-profit agencies that
had an obvious financial incentive to maintain the status
quo.133 As Mareschal suggests, the New Jersey defeat highlights the need for unions to think strategically about how best
to counter “the storm of business political activity”134 in those
states with politically influential for-profit home care agencies.

126. See Assemb. 3778, 2002 Leg., 210th Sess. (N.J. 2003).
127. Id.
128. See Patrice M. Mareschal, Agitation and Control: A Tactical Analysis
of the Campaign Against New Jersey’s Quality Home Care Act 21 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://depts.washington.edu/pcls/
caringlaborconference/Mareschalpaper.pdf ); see also Angela Stewart, Proposed
New Home Health Aide Rules Spur Arguments, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.),
June 24, 2003 (“[T]he workers now make an average hourly wage of $8.79.”).
129. See Mareschal, supra note 128, at 19–20.
130. Id. at 21–23.
131. See id. at 17.
132. See id. at 20.
133. See id. at 21–23; see also Joseph Maddaloni Jr., Bureaucratic Nightmare in the Making: Scrap McGreevey Proposal for a Public Authority to Oversee Home Health Care Services, 172 N.J. L.J. 1027, 1027 (2003) (arguing that
the Act failed to recognize the role that private home care agencies play in
providing quality training for their home health workers). But see Arnold Shep
Cohen, The Case for Oversight of Home Health Care: A Public Authority Is
Needed for an Industry Plagued by Staff Turnover Problems and Inadequate
Care, 173 N.J. L.J. 95, 95 (2003) (arguing that the Act will “vastly improve the
delivery of personal care assistant services in New Jersey”).
134. Mareschal, supra note 128, at 24.
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B. FAMILY CHILD CARE
As Section A suggested, in the context of home care, states
have responded to labor advocates in a variety of ways. In contrast, states have taken a much more uniform approach in the
family child care context: they have relied overwhelmingly on
executive orders to grant labor law rights to family child care
providers. Of the ten states that presently have a process in
place to recognize family child care unions, the governors in
nine of those states signed executive orders mandating the
process.135 Illinois was the first state to bring publicly subsidized family child care providers into the scope of its labor
laws, doing so in 2005 pursuant to an executive order.136 The
order, which mirrors an earlier order signed on behalf of home
care workers in Illinois, requires the state to “recognize a representative designated by a majority of [the providers] . . . as
the[ir] exclusive representative.”137 It also grants the “representative the same rights and duties granted to employee representatives by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.”138 Later that year, the Illinois legislature codified the order,139
providing the workers with even stronger rights than those expressed in the order. Notably, the law states in clear terms that
the providers are deemed state employees for the purpose of the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act,140 and adds that the state
“shall engage in collective bargaining” with their representative.141
Washington followed closely behind Illinois in granting authority for the state’s publicly subsidized family child care providers to engage in collective bargaining with the state. In September 2005, Governor Christine Gregoire sent an executive
directive to the Secretary of the State Department of Social and
Health Services (DSHS), directing DSHS “to define a process
for family child care providers . . . to have a strong, ongoing
voice” in matters related to their working conditions.142 The let135. The exception is Michigan, which uses an interlocal agreement to
grant collective bargaining rights to publicly subsidized family child care providers. See CHALFIE ET AL., supra note 66, at 18–19.
136. Ill. Exec. Order No. 2005-1, supra note 108.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5) (West 2007).
140. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/3(n).
141. 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9A-11(b-5).
142. Letter from Christine O. Gregoire, Governor, State of Wash., to Robin
Arnold-Williams, Secretary, Dep’t of Soc. and Health Serv., State of Wash.
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ter also specified that the providers should have a chance to
“select a representative for negotiations on their behalf with
DSHS,” and that DSHS should meet with the representative to
discuss matters such as “reimbursement rates, regulation, and
licensing procedures.”143 Shortly thereafter, the workers selected SEIU as their representative.144 In 2006, the legislature
codified the directive and strengthened its essential points.
Under the law, providers are state employees who are entitled
to representation for the purpose of “collective bargaining.”145
The law also designates the governor or a designee as the providers’ employer of record.146
In 2005, AFSCME Council 75 presented union authorization cards to the Oregon Employment Relations Board (OERB)
requesting permission to represent certified and registered
family child care providers in Oregon.147 The following year,
SEIU Local 503 submitted union authorization cards to the
OERB requesting to represent subsidized, license-exempt family child care providers in the state.148 In both instances, OERB
certified the cards, following which Oregon’s governor, Theodore Kulongoski, issued executive orders directing state agencies to meet and confer with the relevant union officials on behalf of the providers “regarding issues of mutual concern.”149 In
2007, the Oregon legislature codified the provisions of both executive orders, but replaced the executive orders’ “meet-andconfer” approach with a much stronger “collective bargaining”
process.150 The legislation provides that the state will serve as

(Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://www.governor.wa.gov/execorders/dir_05_
09_16-2.pdf.
143. Id.
144. Paul Nyhan, Child Care Operators to Join Union with Vote, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 22, 2005, at B1.
145. WASH. REV. CODE § 41.56.028 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
146. Id. § 41.56.028(2).
147. Or. Exec. Order No. 05-10, 44-11 Or. Bull. 4 (Sept. 23, 2005).
148. Or. Exec. Order No. 06-04, 45-3 Or. Bull. 6 (Feb. 13, 2006).
149. Or. Exec. Order No. 06-04, supra note 148, at 2; Or. Exec. Order No.
05-10, supra note 147, at 2; see also Or. Exec. Order No. 07-03, 46-3 Or. Bull. 6
(Feb. 1, 2007) (requiring state agencies to “engage in collective negotiations
and attempt to reach an agreement with [the unions], on behalf of their respective segments of the family child care provider population” during the period from 2009 to 2011).
150. OR. REV. STAT. § 657A.430(3) (2007) (stating that family child care
providers “have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation and collective bargaining on matters concerning labor relations”).
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the public employer of record for the providers,151 and treats
the providers as public employees for the sole purpose of “collective bargaining.”152
The executive orders and subsequent statutes in Illinois,
Washington, and Oregon comprise an approach that emphatically extends to publicly subsidized family child care providers
state labor law protection in the form of collective bargaining
rights. Iowa and Wisconsin, by comparison, permit the unionization of providers, but are far more restrictive in terms of the
actual rights given to the providers.153 In 2006, Iowa’s governor
signed executive orders regarding both registered family child
care providers154 and license-exempt providers of subsidized
child care.155 The orders provide that state agencies “shall meet
and confer with the authorized representative” of the providers,156 and that in doing so, the agencies “shall discuss issues of
mutual concern, including training requirements, reimbursement rates, payment procedures, [and] health and safety conditions.”157 Although AFSCME has since won a union election,
giving it the right to represent registered providers in Iowa,158
the executive orders suffer from the same limitations discussed
earlier in the context of the Iowa executive order for independent home care workers:159 the orders grant the providers only
meet-and-confer rights and do not treat the providers as state
employees for any purpose. Finally, because the legislature has
not codified the orders’ provisions, any subsequent governor or
legislature can eliminate these rights with the stroke of a pen.

151. Id. § 657A.430(2) (“For purposes of collective bargaining . . . the State
of Oregon is the public employer of record of family child care providers.”).
152. Id. § 657A.430(4) (“[F]amily child care providers are not for any other
purpose employees of the State of Oregon or any other public body.”).
153. Publicly subsidized family child care providers in Kansas and Pennsylvania also recently received the right to unionize as a result of executive
orders that reflect a meet-and-confer approach. See Kan. Exec. Order No. 0721, supra note 66; Pa. Exec. Order No. 2007-07, supra note 66; Pa. Exec. Order
No. 2007-06, supra note 66.
154. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 45, supra note 66.
155. See id.
156. See Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, supra note 66, ¶ 1; Iowa Exec. Order No.
45, supra note 66, ¶ 1.
157. Iowa Exec. Order No. 46, supra note 66, ¶ 2; Iowa Exec. Order No. 45,
supra note 66, ¶ 2.
158. See Clyde Weiss, Standing Up and Speaking Out, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE,
Jan./Feb. 2007, at 26, 26.
159. See supra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
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The union status of family child care providers in Wisconsin is somewhat comparable to that of Iowa. In 2006, Wisconsin
Governor Jim Doyle signed an executive order that takes the
form of a meet-and-confer requirement.160 The order requires
the Department of Health and Family Services “to meet and
confer with a recognized exclusive majority representative of
family child care providers in Wisconsin” for the purpose of discussing various issues including “reimbursement and payment
procedures,” as well as training.161 The providers have since
voted to have AFSCME as their representative.162 However, as
is true of the Iowa order, the Wisconsin order has not been codified by the legislature, and the order does not regard the workers as state employees for any purpose.163
The legal approaches used by the states to extend labor
rights to family child care providers all rely on establishing an
employer of record, as is also true with the unionization of
home care workers. Yet the unionization of family child care
providers differs in one notable respect from the unionization of
home care workers: the latter incorporates public authorities
that are responsible for ensuring quality of services. The absence of such authorities in the context of family child care unionization raises an interesting observation. Although concerns
about caregiving quality characterize both the home care and
family child care campaigns, this issue seems to be most pronounced in the former context. The relative importance of caregiving quality in the home care campaigns may stem from the
fact that home care consumers and their advocates appear to be
much more vocal and organized in their demands for improved
quality compared with parents who qualify for publicly subsidized family child care.164 One possible explanation for this distinction is that home care consumers are also the recipients of
such care. By contrast, parents who use family child care may
be less informed about the quality of care their children receive
given that the care occurs in their absence.165
160. See Wis. Exec. Order No. 172, supra note 66.
161. Id.
162. Judith Davidoff, Union of Caring: AFSCME Gives Licensed Child Care
Providers a New Voice, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Dec. 9–10, 2006, at
A1.
163. Wis. Exec. Order No. 172, supra note 66 (“Family child care providers
are not employees or agents of the State.”).
164. See, e.g., Delp & Quan, supra note 3, at 11–13 (discussing the involvement of consumer groups in the home care campaign in Los Angeles).
165. But see, e.g., Andrew I. Batavia, The Growing Prominence of Indepen-
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At present, it appears that while ten states have extended
labor rights to publicly subsidized family child care providers,
only three states have contracts in effect covering the providers: Illinois, Oregon, and Washington.166 The Illinois contract
mandates reimbursement rate increases between thirty-five
and forty-nine percent over three years,167 access to affordable
health care, and incentives for providers to acquire training in
early education.168 In Oregon, where both AFSCME and SEIU
represent publicly subsidized providers, the unions signed contracts that provide for substantial increases in reimbursement
rates and a reduction in the time required to process payments
to providers.169 The Washington contract likewise requires increases in subsidy payments to providers. It also includes training subsidies for providers and a commitment to create an affordable health insurance plan.170
Despite these benefits, the union campaigns on behalf of
publicly subsidized family child care providers have not met
with uniform success. The remainder of this Section discusses
the promise and ultimate pitfalls experienced by publicly subsidized family child care providers in Rhode Island and Marydent Living and Consumer Direction as Principles in Long-Term Care: A Content Analysis and Implications for Elderly People with Disabilities, 10 ELDER
L.J. 263, 265–66 (2002) (noting that the demand for access to quality, publicly
subsidized consumer-directed home care began in the 1970s as part of the disability-rights and independent-living movements); Nancy Folbre, Demanding
Quality: Worker/Consumer Coalitions and “High Road” Strategies in the Care
Sector, 34 POL. & SOC. 8, 11, 12 (2006) (noting that quality of care is generally
difficult to gauge in all contexts); Charles P. Sabatino & Simi Litvak, Liability
Issues Affecting Consumer-Directed Personal Assistance Services—Report and
Recommendations, 4 ELDER L.J. 247, 254 (1996); Heather Young & Suzanne
Sikma, Self-Directed Care: An Evaluation, 4 POL’Y POL. & NURSING PRAC. 185,
185 (2003).
166. See Anne Ravana, Maine Child Care Providers Set to Form Union,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Me.), Oct. 22, 2007, at B1.
167. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 4.
168. Press Release, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 49,000 Family Child Care
Providers Negotiate Historic Contract in IL to Raise Standards for Quality
Child Care Services (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.seiu.org/media/
pressreleases.cfm?pr_id=1275.
169. See Oregon AFSCME, AFSCME, State Sign Landmark Child Care
Providers Contract, OREGONAFSCME.COM, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www
.oregonafscme.com/index.cfm?zone=/unionactive/view_article.cfm&HomeID=
44358; SEIU Local 503, Child Care Agreement Reached: Agreement Makes
Care More Accessible, Affordable, SEIU503.ORG, Dec. 8, 2006, http://www
.seiu503.org/care/child/Child_Care_Agreement_Reached.aspx.
170. See Family Child Care Contract, Contract for WA Family Child Care
Providers 2007–2009, available at http://seiu925.wtf.localsonline.org/Early_
Learning/FCCP_Contract/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).
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land. These two states highlight very divergent approaches to
the representation of family child care providers and usefully
illustrate the range of obstacles that unions face as they try to
improve providers’ economic status.
Rhode Island is one of three states where the legislature
approved a measure granting providers some level of representational rights only to have the governor veto the legislation.171
In 2003, SEIU Local 1199 filed a lawsuit to challenge the perception that the state’s publicly subsidized providers were independent contractors as opposed to public-sector employees.172
A similar tactic had failed in California when SEIU attempted
unsuccessfully to persuade the courts that publicly subsidized
home care workers in Los Angeles County were employees of
the County.173 Yet SEIU Local 1199 had surprising early success when the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board (RILRB)
ruled that the providers were state employees and issued an
order giving them the right to unionize under the state’s collective bargaining statute.174 Unfortunately, the success proved to
be short-lived, as Rhode Island’s Republican governor filed a
lawsuit blocking the decision. Eventually, the Rhode Island
Superior Court sided with the governor and reversed the
RILRB’s decision.175
Following this defeat, SEIU lobbied to change the law, resulting in a bill known as the Family Child Care Providers
Business Opportunity Act,176 which retreated from the union’s
earlier position that the providers were unqualified state employees. Instead, the Act authorized the recognition of the providers as state employees only with respect to collective bar-

171. The other two states are California and Massachusetts. See CHALFIE
supra note 66, at 12.
172. See In re R.I., Dep’ts of DCYF & DHS (Home Daycare Providers), EE3671, slip op. at 8 (R.I. State Labor Relations Board Apr. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.dlt.state.ri.us/lrb/pdfs/Decisions/DecisionEE3671.pdf. The Rhode
Island State Labor Relations Act is codified in R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-7-1 to
-7-48 (2003).
173. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
174. See Home Daycare Providers, EE-3671, slip op. at 29.
175. State v. State Labor Relations Bd., C.A. 04-1899, 2005 WL 3059297, at
*8 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005); see also ANNE RODER & DORIE SEAVEY, INVESTING IN LOW-WAGE WORKERS 40 (2006), available at http://www
.workingventures.org/ppv/publications/assets/206_publication.pdf.
176. H.R. 6099 (Substitute A as amended), 2005 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess.
(R.I. 2005), available at http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/BillText05/HouseText05/
H6099Aaa.pdf.
ET AL.,
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gaining.177 In 2005, the General Assembly passed the bill, only
to see it vetoed by the governor.178 While the union has continued its efforts to reintroduce a similar bill in the legislature,
the providers’ best chance of securing collective bargaining
rights at this point may well depend on a change in political
climate.179
More recently, publicly subsidized family child care providers in Maryland encountered a major roadblock. For five years,
SEIU tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Maryland legislature to pass a bill to extend bargaining rights to providers.180
When the legislature failed to do so, the providers turned to the
new Democratic governor, Martin O’Malley. In August 2007,
O’Malley signed an executive order that allowed providers to
designate an organization as their joint negotiating representative, and that required a state agency to meet and negotiate
with the representative on all matters relating to reimbursement rates and other terms and conditions of the labor arrangement.181
Shortly after the order was signed, the providers voted to
join SEIU Local 500.182 The day before, however, a judge issued
a temporary restraining order halting the executive order.183
Notably, the motion for the order was filed by the Maryland
177. Id.
178. Donald Carcieri, Governor, Rhode Island, Child Care Veto Message
(June 22, 2005), available at http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/Child_
Care_Veto_Message.pdf; see also RODER & SEAVEY, supra note 175, at 40.
179. A change in political climate ultimately led to the extension of labor
law rights to publicly subsidized family child care providers in New York. In
2007, providers finally received the right to elect a representative that will be
recognized by the state when newly elected Governor Eliot Spitzer signed an
executive order that requires the state to recognize a representative elected by
the providers and to meet with designated representatives “for the purpose of
entering into a written agreement to the extent feasible.” N.Y. Exec. Order No.
12 (May 8, 2007), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/executive_orders/
exeorders/12.html.
180. Tom LoBianco, O’Malley’s Orders Skirt Assembly, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2007, at B3.
181. Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2007.14 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://
www.gov.state.md.us/executiveorders/01.01.07.14childcareproviders.pdf.
182. Clifford G. Cumber, Local Child Care Providers Support Move to Unionize, FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Md.), Sept. 27, 2007, at B12.
183. See Md. State Family Child Care Ass’n v. O’Malley, No. C-07-291 (Cecil County Ct. Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.msfcca.org/case1.pdf
and http://www.msfcca.org/case2.pdf (granting temporary restraining order);
see also Tom LoBianco, Judge Halts O’Malley Order, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 25,
2007, at A1; Sarah Moses, Child Care Providers Fight Unionization, CUMBERLAND TIMES-NEWS (Md.), Oct. 8, 2007, at 1.
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State Family Child Care Association (MSFCCA), a nonprofit
organization of family child care providers in the state that had
long voiced its opposition to SEIU’s family child care campaign.184 In opposing the union, MSFCCA objected to “SEIU’s
history and organizing tactics” and maintained that it was able
to effectively represent the providers without charging the union dues required by SEIU.185 The conflict highlights the importance of unions forging broad support, including organizations
already advocating on behalf of providers.186
CONCLUSION
All indicators suggest that the need for paid home-based
caregiving will remain a pressing issue for the foreseeable future. The need for family child care will persist given women’s
participation in the paid labor market and parental struggles to
find an acceptable balance between work obligations and parenting responsibilities. Likewise, the demand for home care
will climb steadily upwards as the baby-boom generation ages.
Against this backdrop, one can reasonably expect that when it
comes to publicly funded care in both contexts, states will continue to rely on workers who are legally considered independent contractors, not only because of consumer preference for
such workers, but also because of their cost-savings’ potential.
By treating publicly subsidized home-based care workers not as
state employees but as independent contractors, states are attempting to avoid liability to the workers under applicable employment and labor statutes.
This Article has examined the strategies the labor movement has used to reverse this process and to compel state governments to accept some responsibility for providing homebased care workers with decent wages and workplace benefits.
Even though independent workers in home-based care may not
technically qualify as public employees, the labor movement
has relied on various measures—including legislation, gover184. O’Malley, No. C-07-291.
185. Md. State Family Child Care Ass’n, If You Get a Union Election Ballot, Say No to SEIU (n.d.), available at http://www.msfcca.org/sayno.doc; see
also Clifford G. Cumber, Family Child Care Providers Expect to Join Union,
FREDERICK NEWS-POST (Md.), Sept. 25, 2007, at A11.
186. See Position Statement, supra note 55, at 6 (“If family child care providers already have a voice in early care and education policy making, unions
should respect the work being done and attempt to partner with existing family child care advocates, rather than ignoring and attempting to supplant
them.”).
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nor-issued executive orders, ballot initiatives, and intergovernmental cooperation agreements—to force states to extend
labor law rights to workers, most commonly by requiring a
state agency to function as an employer of record for the workers and to recognize a labor representative on their behalf.
With this approach, unions can enable home-based care workers to participate in shaping the terms and conditions of their
work experiences, while simultaneously respecting the interests of care recipients.

